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Abstract
As female primates carry and nurse the fetus, it naturally falls on
them to rear the o¤spring. On the assumption that males are at least
equally adept at obtaining food, it follows that they generate a surplus
which they might either share with females or consume themselves.
This choice lies at the heart of an evolutionary battle of the sexes. If
females suceed in obtaining a large share of the surplus, there is little
scope for size dimorphism between males and females; otherwise males
can use the surplus to sustain larger and stronger bodies, which are ad-
vantageous in sexual competition with other males. Besides competing
with males, females may compete with each other. Moreover, depen-
dency may coincide with sexiness and such dependency can persist.
This paper examines these ideas in a game-theoretic setting.
1 The female in evolutionary theory
The position of women in technologically advanced societies generates nu-
merous questions. Is there a ‘glass ceiling’? Are women signi…cantly disad-
¤Part of this paper was presented at the World Congress of the Game Theory Soci-
ety under the title of “Female Competition, Near-Monogamy and Sexual Dimorphism;
An Evolutionary and Game-Theoretic Approach.” The authors are grateful to an anony-
mous referee, Robin Dunbar, Mike Ball and participants of seminars at the First World
Congress of the Game Theory Society and the University of Liverpool Department of Ap-
plied Mathematics. The authors are also grateful to Jolanda van den Berg and Dolores
Holtz for editorial comments.
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vantaged because they have the babies and are likely to take a few weeks
or a few years o¤ from employment outside the home? Is there negative
discrimination against women based solely on gender or do women simply
have di¤erence preferences, abilities and opportunities?
Or does modern society provide females with opportunities for advance-
ment that are unavailable to males? More generally, do females have a
di¤erent set of strategies than males to employ in their interactions with
other females and with males, even in the marketplace? Will women, be-
cause of their reputed special nurturing instincts, people-management skills
and ‘emotional intelligence’ eventually dominate management of large or-
ganizations? These questions are subjects of intense emotional and aca-
demic debate and they loom large in policy discussions. But there seems
to be no simple answers, in part because humans are highly intelligent and
exquisitely subtle in their relationships with others and in part because of
the di¤erent roles of males and females in child rearing. Here we take up
a more straightforward question that does seem to be crucial to the forego-
ing questions: How should a female divide her resources between generating
economic power and mothering, while relying on male parental support?
To address these questions, we assume that a female faces a trade o¤
between (i) using her own resources to generate economic power for the
support of herself and her o¤spring and (ii) using those resources more in-
tensively for mothering and relying more heavily on male parental support.
A male faces a trade o¤ between (i) investing his resources in his attrac-
tiveness to females (that is, engaging in male sexual competition) and thus
increasing the number of females with whom he mates and (ii) investing in
the care of his own o¤spring, so that he can have more o¤spring with one
mate. We analyze these trade o¤s using two di¤erent models. Our …rst
model indicates that the extent to which males invest in sexual competitive-
ness (size, for example) is inversely correlated with female dependence. An
exception is when the rearing of o¤spring is not cost-intensive, in which case
females will always be fully dependent. When o¤spring are expensive, as
they are likely to be with humans, female independence correlates directly
with female ablity to generate income.
We next analyze a severe model where the trade o¤ for females is either
to be dependent, and unable to raise o¤spring themselves, or to be indepen-
dent and capable of raising o¤spring themselves. The results suggest that
full female dependence on male support will persist in those settings where
females are less well suited to food gathering (or income acquiring) than
males.
Before proceeding to the analysis, let us put these trade o¤s in a more
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general context. Evolution involves competition and a battle of the sexes.
On the basis of natural selection we expect that those male and female
characteristics that contribute to the ability to attract mates (sexiness) and
promote reproductive output will spread through the population. An es-
sential asymmetry arises between males and females, however, because the
female is more closely associated with o¤spring during an extended period of
time. During this time she makes a sizeable investment of resources in the
o¤spring. Thus, a female cannot abandon her o¤spring without seriously
reducing her …tness; in economic terms, the opportunity cost to the female
of nonsurvival of any one of her o¤spring is high. In contrast, the oppor-
tunity cost to a male of abandoning one or more of his o¤spring may be
quite low and especially so if females are independent.1 Thus, while sexual
reproduction requires joint action, the characteristics that tend to promote
reproductive success for males and females are distinct.
If the female is able to care for the o¤spring herself, the …tness of her
mate is enhanced if she does so while he seeks out new opportunities to
procreate. In contrast, her …tness is enhanced if her mate devotes himself
to providing support for herself and her o¤spring while she takes advantage
of passing opportunities to mate with other males, thereby increasing the
genetic diversity and quality of her o¤spring. Thus, the …tness of the female
may increase with her ability to garner male support, whereas the …tness
of the male may be greater when he maximizes the number of females he
impregnates. The two are at odds: whereas the former requires the male
to invest in parental care, the latter may require the male to invest in the
ability to attract many mates (which may involve the …ghting o¤ of other
males). Hence there is an evolutionary battle of the sexes. A key factor in
this battle will be the female’s ability to support herself and her young in
the absence of male support.
Female primates make large investments in their o¤spring. They produce
the eggs, carry the fetus, and nurse the infants; these are all investments
that the male need not make. If females and males were equally e¢cient at
procuring foods through hunting and gathering, it follows that males must
be able to produce a surplus relative to females. Following other literature,
let us take calories as a numeraire to measure the production of females and
1 In some species, desertion of o¤spring by the female appears to be an important
strategy. McNamara et al. (2000) consider species that have one or more broods each
year during a breeding season of …nite length. In their analysis, the female chooses be-
tween caring for or abandoning each brood after the male has chosen between support or
non-support, with his best choice dependent on the expected number of matings in the
remainder of the breeding season.
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males.2 There are at least two ways in which the surplus calories of males can
be used. Males can use surplus calories to maintain their own larger body
sizes and to engage in male sexual competition for mates. Alternatively,
males can share food with females, in which case we can expect less sexual
size dimorphism – less di¤erence in the sizes of females and males. The
absence of size dimorphism appears typical of monogamous primates.3 The
evolutionary battle of the sexes is re‡ected in a battle over the division of
the surplus generated by males.
Thus, suppose that our early female ancestors had not succeeded in per-
suading males to share food and provide male parental support and that
males were at least as e¢cient at procuring food as females. If males had
no additional energy requirements we would have a contradiction: males
would have more energy available to them but fewer uses for that energy
than females. In particular, if males do not provide parental support, we hy-
pothesize that the extra energy available to males is used up in male sexual
competition.4 It seems that, at least among primates, this sexual competi-
tion typically takes the form of increased size of males.5 This reasoning is
borne out by observed sexual size dimorphism among primates – in general,
the more females provide for their own o¤spring, the greater the di¤erence
in size between the females and the larger males.6
2The use of calories as a numeraire to measure output of gathering and hunting activ-
ities also appears in Kaplan and Robson (1999), for example. We discuss their research
and its implications for ours in a concluding section.
3The absence of large size dimorphism appears typical of monogamous primates. See,
for example, Mace (1992) for a comparison between the extent of size dimorphism in var-
ious primates, humans included. That there is some dimorphism seems to convince some
anthropologists that humans are basically polygynous (cf. Fleagle 1999). The fact that
the extent of human sexual size dimorphism is relatively small convinces others that man
is near-monogamous. While great diversity in human behavior has been observed, perhaps
most economically successful societies are near-monogamous. In a widely reported study,
Dr. Charles Nunn and his collaborators (Nunn, Gittleman and Antonovics 2000) docu-
ment a positive relationship between promiscuity and normal high white blood cell counts
of primates and observe that humans have white blood cell counts that are consistent with
near-monogamy.
By near-monogamy and even by ‘monogamy’ we mean that males and females are, on
the whole, ‘faithful to the nest’. Each contributes care to one particular family unit but
each may take advantage of passing opportunities to have more genetically varied o¤spring
and, for the male, to have some o¤spring ‘on the side’ to whom he provides little parental
support.
4 It may be that the larger size of males leads to further specialization of males and
females. Males may take leading roles in defence against territorial predators from other
species, for example. We do not examine this question.
5See Fleagle (1999), p. 307 or Mace (1992), p. 54,
6Note that this is quite distinct from the frequent observation that the more polygynous
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What strategies females may have evolved to capture the surplus gener-
ated by males has been little investigated in the literature. In this paper
we propose that one possibility is that females, by being slightly less able to
raise their o¤spring themselves, may put males in the position where they
evolve to provide male parental support.7 (In the following, this is apparent
in equation (6).)
If females are dependent on male support to raise their o¤spring, then
the quality and quantity of that support is important. It is not clear that the
support of one male is particularly important. But since males have limited
resources it would seem natural that females compete with each other for
mates who will be faithful to the nest.8 Dependency may also be important
for this female-female competition. If a male sires o¤spring with more than
one female and one needs his support while the other does not, all else being
equal, he will maximize his …tness by providing support to the dependent
female. If a female can slightly decrease her own ability to raise her o¤spring
by herself and, by so doing, convince her partner that he will maximize his
…tness by being faithful to her nest, then this may be a winning strategy –
by a small decrease in her own capability she gains the support of another
person.
This paper, one in a planned series investigating the evolutionary foun-
dations of female competition, continues the idea introduced in Wooders and
van den Berg (2001) in a local equilibrium setting, that dependency of fe-
males and co-evolution of responsiveness of males to this dependency may be
a feature of the evolution of humans. It also relates sexual size dimorphism
to female dependency, which itself is connected to the needs of o¤spring. We
note that a number of researchers in biology have discussed the importance
a species, the greater the sexual size dimorphism (cf. Gould and Gould 1997). While the
outcomes are the same, the root causes di¤er. Here, our starting point is the observation
that females and their o¤spring may bene…t from male parental support. To the extent
that males devote resources to provide this support, they do not have these resources
available to engage in con‡ict with other males. The bene…ts to males of large size, relative
to other males are less important to evolutionary selection when more of the resources
available to males are required for parental support. If, for example, the support of two
parents is essential for the survival of o¤spring, then males cannot bene…t from competition
with other males for multiple mates.
7Of course females may become more dependent when their o¤spring are more depen-
dent.
8Since the time (and, in modern societies, the money) of each male is limited, there is
an opportunity cost of choosing any particular male and this opportunity cost is higher,
other things equal, the more dispersed his parental support. Contrast this with situations
where male parental support is irrelevant. In this case, each female can do no better than
mate with the sexiest male – the one who is likely have sexy o¤spring.
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of female strategies and male parental support among primates, cf. Dunbar
(1992,1995), Hrdy (1989), McNamara et al (2000) and references therein.
Our research di¤ers signi…cantly in that our focus is on the trade o¤s be-
tween sexiness and parental support, and the strategies females may use to
elicit male support.
2 The trade o¤ between male sexual competitive-
ness and male parental support
Let us assume that females are able to set their allocation of time between
gathering of calories and carrying/nurturing o¤spring. Let y 2 [0; 1] denote
the fraction of time females spend on the gathering of calories. The remain-
der 1 ¡ y of their time is spent on raising o¤spring. We assume that each
o¤spring requires a time period T0 during which the female is unable to
gather calories; this period T0 corresponds to the last phases of pregnancy
plus the initial period of childcare. The rate at which females produce o¤-
spring is (1 ¡ y)=T0. Since T0 is a constant we can represent the female’s
…tness by (1 ¡ y).
Let x 2 [0; 1] denote the fraction of the calories generated by a male
that he invests in acquiring sexual competitiveness; the remainder (1 ¡ x)
is spent on his o¤spring. We assume that males compete for access to
females. A male’s …tness is the product of the …tness of his mate(s) times
the number of his mates. To …nd this number, let K(x) denote the sexual
competitiveness of a male who spends a fraction x on the development of
such competitiveness; and let ¹K denote the average competitiveness of the
males. Then the expected number of mates is
K(x)
¹KNMNF
where NM is the number of males in the population and NF is the number
of females. The ‡ux of energy per time (power) PS(x) received by each of
the male’s mates is
PS(x) = (1 ¡ x)
¹KNM
K(x)NF PM
where PM > 0 is the power generated by a male which he distributes between
competitiveness and parental support. We assume PM to be equal for all
the males in the population.
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A female’s choice of time allocation y is constrained by the support she
receives from her mate, characterized by x:
(1 ¡ y)U0
T0
· yPF + PS(x) (1)
where PF > 0 is the power (calories per time) generated by the female
when she is foraging, and where U0 is taken to be the minimal amount of
energy required by each o¤spring. If the male supplies (more than) su¢cient
support, that is, if
PS(x) ¸ U0T0 ;
the female is able to set y = 0, which gives her the maximal …tness 1, and
the male a …tness (K(x)NF )=( ¹KNM). Otherwise, she has to spend at least
a fraction
y(x) =
U0=T0 ¡ PS(x)
U0=T0 + PF (2)
of her time on foraging. To maximize her …tness (1¡y), she should spend no
more than this fraction of time on foraging; we will assume that all females
behave in this manner.9 The male’s …tness in this case is
(1 ¡ y(x))(K(x)NF )=( ¹KNM).
It is convenient to use PM as a unit of power. Thus we de…ne dimen-
sionless parameters
´ =
PF
PM and ½ =
U0=T0
PM : (3)
The parameter ´ expresses how well females are suited to foraging compared
to males. The parameter ½ expresses the cost-intensiveness of o¤spring. If
½ > 1, a male devoting all his power to a single female who does no foraging
herself is unable to supply her with the energy she needs. We now analyze
the ES (evolutionarily stable) values of x, under two further assumptions:
(i) equal sex ratio, NF = NM ; and (ii) sexual competitiveness is directly
proportional to investment K(x) / x.
Consider the …tness of a male who invests a fraction x of the energy he
generates in sexual competitiveness, in a population in which the average
9Thus we assume that females adopt in life history time to whatever their needs dictate;
in evolutionary time this adaptation is instantaneous. Hence females can be described by
equation (2).
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such investment by a male is ¹x. We denote this …tness f(x; ¹x). On the above
assumptions and scaling, we obtain:
f(x; x) =
8>><>>:
x
x
x · x
½ + x
1
½ + ´
+
x
x
¢ ´ ¡ x
½ + ´
x >
¹x
½ + ¹x
(4)
where x · ¹x½+¹x corresponds to support which is (more than) su¢cient to
support a female at y = 0. We show in Appendix A that the ES values of x
are as follows:
x^ =
½
1 ¡ ½ 0 < ½ · 1 ¡ ´
minf1; ´g ½ > 1 ¡ ´ (5)
with corresponding values for the female’s foraging fraction:
y(x^) =
½ + x^ ¡ 1
½ + ´
: (6)
The dependence of x^ and y^ on the parameters ½ and ´ is shown in
Figure 1. Male support is only provided when ´ < 1. Male support is
represented as a darker tone (black: x = 0; white: x = 1): Males need to
provide more support as females have lower food-gathering ability (low ´)
and as o¤spring require a higher investment of power (high ½). Females
have to rely entirely on their own food gathering ability when they are
more adept at gathering food than males (´ > 1). Female dependence is
represented as a darker tone (white: y(x^) = 1; black: y(x^) = 0.) Females
can only rely completely on male support if ½ + ´ < 1; otherwise they need
to spend some portion of their time on foraging. This analysis suggests
that male parental support may be enforced by the female’s relative lack of
food gathering capacity, while some degree of independence is imposed on
the females when o¤spring are energy-intensive (½ > 1), regardless of the
female’s relative food gathering capacity ´.
8
Figure 1:
Male support and female dependence.
Of course on the slower evolutionary time scale, the parameters ½ and ´
might change. Changes in ´ on this time scale re‡ect alterations in anatomy
or physiology or the environmental considerations, such as the characteris-
tics of the workplace, which a¤ect ´, the relative food gathering ability of
females.
3 A severe model with female dependence
In the previous section we assumed that mating assortment was governed
by male sexual competition for access to the females. Here we examine
the opposite assumption that females control mating and assortment and
that the ‡ows of energy devoted to o¤spring are governed by female sexual
competition for male parental support. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that a female makes a lifetime commitment to one of the following strategies:
either she forgoes the development of food gathering (more generally, income
earning) ability in exchange for an increased ability to garner male support
or she develops food gathering capabilities and gives up a competitive edge
in female sexual competition.10 Can dependent females trade o¤ the ability
10We need not assume that the strategies are genetically hard-wired; for the purposes
of our analysis it is immaterial whether a parent imbues a child with their strategy choice
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to attract male support –sexiness – against the ability to single-handedly
support their own o¤spring? In the following, we show that for a very
severe model, where dependent (but sexy) females cannot raise any o¤spring
at all without male support, there are population equilibria with positive
proportions of dependent females.
There are two male strategies: supporter (S) and non-supporter (S).
S-males invest power in the propagation of the S-strategy, whereas S-males
do not, and rely on the power contributed by their female partners. There
are two female strategies: dependent (D) and independent (D). D-females
have no earning power, and rely on male partners for support in propagating
their strategy by raising o¤-spring. D-females have earning power, but trade
this o¤ against a lowered ability to attract S-male partners.
A traditional view in human societies has been that males should be S,
and females should be D. The …rst question we ask is whether (all S,
all D) is the single, stable equilibrium of the evolutionary dynamics that act
on the four strategies. More speci…cally, we would like to characterize the
socio-economic conditions under which this state of a¤airs holds true. This
consideration naturally leads to further questions: in which societies is D
the dominant strategy for females? Under what conditions can we expect S
to be a dominant strategy?
3.1 Pay-o¤s to the four strategies
Let fS 2 [0; 1] be the fraction of supportive males and let fD 2 [0; 1] be the
fraction of dependent females. We assume that D-females attract a fraction
¾fD
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD
of the S-male power input toward propagation. This formula is derived as
follows. Let ÁD be the rate at which D-females emit sexual signals to S-
males, and let Á ¹D be the rate at which D-females emit such signals (where we
assume all signals to be of equal strength, which is not a real restriction).
Suppose that there are NF females. Consider an S-male who chooses a
partner upon receiving of a sexual signal. The probability that the female in
question is D is found by dividing the rate at which the male receives signals
from D-females, ÁDfDNF , by the rate at which he receives signals from all
females, ÁDfDNF + ÁD(1 ¡ fD)NF . The result is the above formula, with
¾ = ÁD=ÁD. We call ¾ the ‘sexiness ratio’. We assume ¾ ¸ 1, with equality
by endowing them with a particular gene, or by impressing certain morals on them. In
this sense, we are actually concerned with the adaptive dynamics of ‘memes’.
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occurring only if D-females have no earning power. The condition ¾ > 1
when D-females do have some earning power re‡ects our basic assumption
that sexual attractiveness is trade o¤ against earning power.11
We assume that the number of males NM is equal to the number of
females NF , and that the following number of S-males mate for life with D
females:
fSNM
1 ¡ fD
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD :
This leaves the following number of D-females unmatched to S-males
(1 ¡ fD)NF
µ
1 ¡ fS
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD
¶
:
We assume that these females mate with S-males, not necessarily for life.
The remainder of the S-males mates with D-females, though not necessarily
for life, since the D-females may be ‘overmatched’ (as ¾ > 1). S-males and
D-females cannot mate successfully, as neither contributes power to parental
support.
Each S-male contributes an amount PM of power toward propagation,
and each D-female contributes an amount PF = ´PM of power. Here
0 < ´ · 1, which is now taken to re‡ect the trade o¤ between attrac-
tiveness and earning power. The condition ´ < 1 does not express female
inferiority, but rather that females have to forgo some productive power in
order to gain increased sexual attractiveness. S-males and D-females do not
contribute to earning power. The equal sex ratio (NF = NM) implies that
the reproductive pay-o¤ is equally shared out between the two strategies.
The o¤spring of S-males receive the following investment of power:
fSNMPM + fSNM 1 ¡ fD1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD ´PM
11Our assumed correlation between independence and sexual attractiveness should not
be taken to imply that we assume that independent, career-making women are inherently
less attractive, either because men consider professional competence unfeminine, or, worse,
because unattractive women are compelled to seek an independent existence. What we
mean rather is that an investment of time and e¤ort in generating the potential to earn
is at the expense of the generation of sexual signals, particularly during an early phase
in life when relationships are built. We view the trade o¤ as having a basic mechanistic,
rather than a normative, basis. We certainly do not intend to say that the earning power
of a female is sexually unattractive in and of itself.
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where the …rst term is due to the S-males themselves, and the second to
their D partners. Half of this goes toward the S-strategy; and therefore the
following equation obtains for ZS , the per capita pay-o¤ for the S strategy:
ZS =
µ
1 + ´
(¾ ¡ 1)fD + 1 ¡ fS
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD
¶ PM
2
: (7)
The S-strategy feeds entirely of the earning power of D-females unmatched
to S-males; their per capita pay-o¤ is thus given by:
Z ¹S =
1 ¡ fD
1 ¡ fS ¢
(¾ ¡ 1)fD + 1 ¡ fS
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD ¢
´PM
2
: (8)
The investment of power in o¤spring of D-females is due to S-males exclu-
sively. The per capita pay-o¤ works out as follows:
ZD =
¾fSPM=2
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD : (9)
D-females, …nally, have their own contribution as well as some of the S-male
support:
ZD =
µ
fS
1 + (¾ ¡ 1)fD + ´
¶ PM
2
: (10)
3.2 Nullclines and equilibria
Making minimal and natural assumptions on evolutionary dynamics based
on the pay-o¤s, we can determine the nullclines and direction …eld of the
system, simply by equating the pay-o¤s (see Appendix B). Thus, the rate
of change of fS will be zero when ZS = Z ¹S ; the locus of this equality can
be given as:
fS = 1 ¡ ´ fD(1 ¡ fD)(¾ ¡ 1)¡1 + fD (11)
which describes the nullcline starting at (fD = 0; fS = 1), lying below fS = 1
for 0 < fD < 1, and ending at (fD = 1; fS = 1). It is obvious that the
male nullcline ends at (fD = 1; fS = 1): with all females being dependent,
the S-males having no D-females to sustain their o¤spring. Slightly less
obvious is why the nullcline begins at (fD = 0; fS = 1): When all females are
independent, there are equal numbers of S-males and of females not matched
to S-males, implying Z ¹S = ´°=2, which is smaller than ZS whenever fS < 1
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(and ´ > 0). Besides the nullcline described by equation (11), there are two
trivial male nullclines, fS ´ 0 and fS ´ 1.
The female nullcline is found from ZD = Z ¹D, and is given by:
fS = ´
µ
1
¾ ¡ 1 + fD
¶
: (12)
There are again two trivial nullclines, fD ´ 0 and fD ´ 1.
The intersections of male and female nullclines de…ne equilibria. The
stability of these equilibria can be assessed by consideration of the direction
…eld, combined with the Routh-Hurwitz criteria for stability. As illustrated
in Figure 2 below, three cases can be distinguished:
I : ¾ < ¾lo
def= ´ + 1 (13)
II : ¾lo < ¾ < ¾hi
def=
1
1 ¡ ´ (14)
III : ¾ > ¾hi: (15)
In case I, the female nullcline described by equation (12) lies outside the
state space (0; 1) £ (0; 1). The single stable equilibrium is (fD = 0; fS = 1):
all females are independent, all males supportive. In case II, the female
nullcline, equation (12), intersects the male nullcline, equation (12), in a
stable equilibrium in which all four strategies are present. The point of
intersection (f¤D; f¤S) depends on the parameters as follows:
f¤D =
1 + (1 ¡ ¾)=´
1 + (1 ¡ 2¾ + ¾2(1 ¡ ´))=´ (16)
f¤S =
´
¾ ¡ 1 +
´ + 1 ¡ ¾
1 + (1 ¡ 2¾ + ¾2(1 ¡ ´))=´ : (17)
In case III, the female nullcline, equation (12), lies below the male null-
cline (11); the single stable equilibrium point is now (fD = 1; fS = 1): the
traditional role pattern.
The three cases depicted correspond to regions in the ´ ¡ ¾ parameter
space of the model, separated by the loci of ¾ = ¾lo and ¾ = ¾hi (Figure 2).
For ´ = 1, case III does not arise (¾lo lies at in…nity). As ¾ goes from ¾lo
to ¾hi for a given value of ´, the equilibrium point (f¤D; f¤S) travels from
(0; 1) to (1; 1). At some intermediate value ¾^, f¤S attains a minimum, and
the proportion of S-males is then at a maximum. This intermediate ¾ value
is
¾^ =
r
1 + ´
1 ¡ ´ : (18)
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Figure 2 shows ¾^ as a dashed line. Let (f^¤D; f^¤S) denote the equilibrium point
at this ¾ value. From equations (16), (17), and (18) it follows that
f^¤D =
1
2
and f^¤S =
´
2
¢
p
1 + ´ +
p
1 ¡ ´p
1 + ´ ¡ p1 ¡ ´ : (19)
Thus, the proportion of S-males is maximal when there are equal numbers
of D- and D-females. This fraction 1 ¡ f^¤S is in fact zero when ´ ! 0,
as D-females then become indistinguishable from D-females, and unable to
support o¤spring of S-males. When ´ = 1, 1 ¡ f^¤S becomes 1=2 (¾^ lies at
in…nity). For intermediate values of ´, the S-males fraction achieved at ¾^
lies in between 0 and 1=2 . Prominent proportions of S-males clearly require
´ values near 1.
From this severe model we conclude that the traditional (D;S) pattern
appears only when independent females are less able to generate earning
power than males; if having o¤spring does not inhibit earning power, then
female dependence will not spread through a population. (By construction,
our severe model does not allow the required support of o¤spring to exceed
maximal male parental support.) If, however, the e¤ects of female sexiness
are large relative to female earning power, outcomes correspond to the tradi-
tional role pattern of dependent females and supportive males. Mixed cases
occur between these two extremes. It is interesting that the non-supportive
male strategy persists only in the intermediate range II, where female earn-
ing power is relatively large. In some sense, this region perhaps represents
a transition between the traditional society (with low ´ and high ¾) to a
modern hi-tech society (with high ´ and low ¾ < ¾lo). The parameters ´
and ¾ characterize a community. Both can be estimated for modern human
societies: ´ is a fairly straightforward to estimate as the ratio of income
awarded for comparable jobs between females and males. The following
expression estimates ¾:
¾ =
(1 ¡ fD)p
(1 ¡ p)fD
where fD is the fraction of dependent females and p is the fraction of sup-
portive males’ earning invested in the o¤spring of dependent females. The
former, fD, is relatively easy to estimate (all that is required is a classi…-
cation of females into dependent and independent, which can be done on
the basis of self-reliance, that is, the presence of an independent income
greater than some cut-o¤ value), whereas the fraction p requires more de-
tailed statistics which may be di¢cult to obtain in practice. It should be
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interesting to correlate the ´ and ¾ values of a community with other socio-
economic indices. For instance, technological advancement may correlate
with high ´ values, while high ´ values may be found together with more
stringent cultural mores governing ‘appropriate’ behavior in females (which
bears upon perceived attractiveness).
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4 Discussion
The following considerations suggest that male support is important in hu-
mans. The unique intelligence which characterizes the human species ap-
pears to require that human infants have large heads, so large, in fact, that
the human newborn, unlike other newborn primates, is unable to support
the weight of his head. Thus, unlike other primates, even though his hands
can grasp tightly (but not tight enough to hold his own weight), a human
baby cannot simply cling to his mother as she goes about her earning her
living. Humans, relative to other primates, are born early; it is several years
from birth before a human child can make his own way in the world. Human
babies require constant care. The mother can bene…t greatly from help in
raising her o¤spring; male parental support may be crucial. In evolutionary
time, females who are more successful at obtaining male parental support
can have more surviving o¤spring; they will have a higher …tness than fe-
males who may be more able, in some respects, to raise their o¤spring alone
but capture less male support in raising the o¤spring. Thus, when male
parental care is important, evolution may favor females who are able to en-
tice males to be faithful to the nest – that is, to provide support and care for
the female and her o¤spring, although perhaps taking advantage of passing
opportunities to mate, without commitment, with other females.
The central importance of female dependency in humans may be gleaned
from the following two examples. The examples both illustrate that in
hunter-gatherer societies, females and their o¤spring may be dependent on
males. In one, females and their o¤spring are dependent on males for food
sharing and in the other, for some food sharing and for protection from other
males.12
Among the hunter-gatherer Ache Indians of Paraguay, who were virtually
untouched by other civilizations until the nineteen sixties, male support of
females through sharing of food appears crucial. Prior to the establishment
of missions in Ache lands, most hunting was done by the males and most
gathering, by the females. It is estimated that males contributed 82% of
the caloric needs of the group. Females, of course, were not idle; they
typically have their hands …lled – literally and …guratively – with children.
Kaplan and Robson (1999) present data on the amounts of food, measured
in calories, consumed and produced by males, who hunt, and by females,
who gather. Up until about age 45, perhaps when her youngest child is no
12 Isaac (1978) has proposed that collective food sharing and processing approximately
two million years ago was a critical step in the evolution of language, intelligence, and the
sexual division of labor.
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longer an infant, the typical Ache female does not support her own caloric
needs. In contrast, a typical male in his prime will produce through hunting
approximately double his own caloric requirements.13 In his prime as a
hunter, at about age 33, he produces enough calories to feed himself and to
provide the additional calories required by a female partner of child-bearing
years and of two children, one aged 13 and the other aged 7.
Among the !Kung, who live in nomadic bands in the desert/savannah of
southern Africa, the division of labor is strict: women gather, men hunt and
children play – and men occasionally make war. Gatherers obtain about 60%
of the food, and take less time to do their gathering than the hunters (who
do, however, provide some essential nutrients). Interband …ghts are rare but
when they do occur and one side loses, the e¤ects can be disastrous for the
women and children of the defeated band.14 Indeed, it is apparent that the
life style of the !Kung reduces the observed fertility of !Kung females. The
evidence indicates that relative to !Kung women living their traditional no-
madic life, women living nearer to cattleposts have more o¤spring. Indeed,
it has been estimated that 52% of the nomadic !Kung females will bear no
o¤spring. The …gures for the Ache are quite di¤erent. In terms of a popula-
tion growth model, of the sort in Robson and Wooders (1997) for example,
the social norms governing the distribution of the gains from production of
the Ache are more productive than those of the !Kung; populations grow
faster when males contribute more parental support.
We have discussed a battle of the sexes fought over the surplus gener-
ated by males, a surplus which arises naturally from the fact that many
of the burdens of raising o¤spring tend to fall on the female. We have as-
sumed that female …tness would bene…t from expenditure of this surplus on
parental investment, while male would bene…t from expenditure on sexual
competitiveness (body growth), insofar as females are able at all to raise
o¤spring without support. In fact, depending on the female’s power base,
parental investment of this surplus may increase the …tness of both sexes.
In particular, if females control male access to procreation, and are able to
13Michelle White suggests that this may be simply one solution to a coordination prob-
lem; the other solution would have females doing the hunting while males provided most
of the gathered food and the child care. An obvious problem with this is that females
have less upper body strength than males; it is the view of at least one of the authors of
this paper that this lack of upper body strength is not entirely the result of lack of certain
sorts of exercises. Male olympists and female olympists probably train equally hard but
still the females appear to have less upper body strength. While we have argued that
female dependency is a possible equilibrium outcome, we do not believe that the position
of males and females are interchangeable.
14See Gould and Gould (1996), Hrdy (1981) and Landers (1992).
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exact some sort of guarantee before allowing the male access, non-supportive
males will not be …t. On the other hand, if males are able to enforce sexual
contact, investment in bodily strength confers …tness (both in combatting
male rivals and perhaps in ensuring female cooperation).
The idea that females have evolved to be dependent in certain ways may
explain that fact that females have less upper body strength than males and,
because of this, are typically unable to defend themselves against attack by
males, but it does not suggest that females are less able to function in the
modern world of high tech and large social and economic organizations. In
fact, the implication may be the opposite; because females had to evolve
strategies to elicit male support and resolve con‡icts with males and other
problems in a nonviolent manner (in view of the male’s greater physical
strength), females may have evolved strategies that make them superior at
various skills that are highly valued in modern societies.15
Intriguingly, cultural factors in‡uence and modify the female power base
on a time scale which is likely to be much faster than that of evolutionary
dynamics. This disparity of time scales may result in our retention of in-
stincts which evolved under circumstances that no longer prevail. We might
do well to keep this in mind when we accord roles to men and women in
generating economic power and in raising o¤spring.
5 Appendix A
We note some elementary properties of f(x; ¹x) which will be used below.
First,
d
dx
f(x; ¹x) > 0 0 · x · 1 (20)
when ¹x < ´, and, in addition,
d
dx
f(x; ¹x)
8><>:
> 0 0 · x < ¹x
½ + ¹x
< 0 x >
¹x
½ + ¹x
(21)
15 In fact, many evolutionary theorists and biologists take the view that human intel-
ligence was an evolved outcome resulting from the demands of hunting. In summarizing
this view, Hrdy writes “Success depended on special male skills: visual-spatial capacities,
stamina, stalking abilities and especially cooperation.” Hrdy (1989, p.5). In contrast,
Hrdy (1989), in her own research, and Dunbar (1996), express viewpoints according a
larger role in the development of intelligence to socializing behaviors.
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when ¹x > ´.
To prove that equation (5) describes ES values, we consider the cases in
turn.
Case 1: ´ ¸ 1. We take all non-mutant males at x = x^ = 1. Since the
mutant is present in a negligible fraction of the males, we can take ¹x = x^.
By property (20) above, f(1; 1) > f(~x; 1) for any mutant with ~x < x^ = 1,
which is therefore unable to establish itself.
Case 2: ´ < 1, 0 < ½ · 1 ¡ ´. We take all non-mutant males at x =
x^ = 1 ¡ ½, and consider whether a mutant with ~x 6= x^ can invade, again
with ¹x = x^. Since ½ < 1 ¡ ´, x^ = 1 ¡ ½ > ´. We thus have ¹x > ´, and
by property (21) above, a male can achieve maximal …tness for x = ¹x½+¹x =
x^. Thus, no mutant ~x 6= x^ can achieve a strictly higher …tness than the
population males at x^ = 1 ¡ ½, and the population cannot be invaded by
any such mutant.
Case 3: ´ < 1, ½ > 1 ¡ ´. In a population with ¹x = ´, all mutants
such that ´½+´ · ~x · 1 achieve the same maximal …tness 1½+´ (¹x = ´ is in
that interval). Thus, mutants ~x 6= ¹x can invade by drift. However, we can
show that the population average ¹x returns to ´ under such perturbations.
If ¹x < ´, mutants with ~x > ¹x have a higher …tness than males with x · ¹x, by
property (20) above. As a result, ¹x increases. On the other hand, if ¹x > ´,
property (21) implies f(~x; ¹x) > f(·x; ¹x) for ¹x½+¹x · ~x < ¹x and ·x ¸ ¹x since
·x ¸ ¹x > ¹x½+¹x (the latter is true because ½ + ¹x > 1, which itself follows from
½ > 1 ¡ ´ and ¹x > ´). The population average ¹x will therefore decrease
(conditional on the presence of mutants in the interval [ ¹x½+¹x ; ¹x)). Since ¹x
increases for ¹x < ´ and ¹x decreases for ¹x > ´, x^ = ¹x is ES. (Remark: the
mild dependence on mutational drift may be taken as a reason not to regard
this value as ‘strictly’ ES.)
6 Appendix B
We assume that the evolutionary dynamics of fD and fS are autonomous
and only depend on the state (fD; fS):
d
dt
fD = HD(fD; fS)
d
dt
fS = HS(fD; fS)
(22)
The interpretation of the problem immediately tells us that
HD = 0 ( fD = 0 or fD = 1 and HS = 0 ( fS = 0 or fS = 1 (23)
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which de…ne the nullclines on the boundaries of the phase space. For phase
points in the interior of the phase space (that is (fD; fS) 2 (0; 1) £ (0; 1)),
we assume that HD and HS are smooth and, if the notion that the pay-o¤s
govern the evolutionary dynamics is to make sense, the direction …eld should
agree in sign with the di¤erences in pay-o¤s:
HD(fD; fS) T 0 as ZD T Z ¹D and HS(fD; fS)) T 0 as ZS T Z ¹S : (24)
Stability of an equilibrium point on the boundary of phase space requires
that this point is approached locally by at least one phase path on which the
component of the tangent vector perpendicular to the boundary is directed
towards the boundary (or, when the equilibrium point is in a corner, when
the two components perpendicular to the boundaries are both directed to-
wards the boundaries). The existence of such a path can be ruled out if
all interior elements of the direction …eld in a neighborhood of the equilib-
rium have a perpendicular component away from the boundary; in that case
the boundary is repulsive. This repulsiveness renders almost all boundary
equilibria unstable, with the exception of the equilibrium at (0; 1) which is
stable for ¾ < ¾lo, and the equilibrium at (1; 1) which is stable for ¾ > ¾hi.
Let ² denote a perturbation of the fD; fS system about the equilibrium
point in the interior of the phase space. Expanding the components of the
tangent vector to lowest signi…cant order, we obtain the linearized system
_² = J ² which is stable when the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J both have
a negative real part, which is the case if and only if both the trace of J is
negative and the determinant of J is positive. The …rst of these conditions
is satis…ed in virtue of assumption (24), whereas the second can be rendered
as a condition on the slopes of the nullclines, which is readily veri…ed by
inspection.
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